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In the original problem, no communication or collusion is possible, and the only
information available to the agents is the number of attendees in the past. An agent
will go if it predicts less than 60 agents will go, and will stay home otherwise. Arthur
suggested that bounded rationality, together with learning, can yield solutions to prob-
lems of resource allocation in decentralized environments, using the El Farol problem
as an example [9]. At this point, the problem in the research literature diverged into two
branches, differentiated by their utility functions. The ﬁrst branch was as in Arthur’s
paper:
Util(ag[i]) =

 
 
x attended and undercrowded
0 did not attend
−y attended and overcrowded
The second branch used another kind of utility function:
Util(ag[i]) =
(
x part of minority group
−y not part of minority group
Inthispaper,weusetheﬁrstutilityfunction,wherex = y = 0.5.3 Arthurshowed[1]
that if each agent uses a set of personal basic deterministic strategies (such as going if
more than 55 agents went last time), combined with a simple learning algorithm, then
the system converges to the capacity after some initial learning time. Moreover, mem-
bership kept changing, and some degree of fairness was maintained. Arthur described
the emergent ecology as almost organic in nature. In his work, Edmonds [5] took this
analogy a step further by using genetic algorithms for learning, and allowing commu-
nication. Edmonds showed that these were sufﬁcient for the development of different,
interesting social roles.
However, both solutions produced systems that ﬂuctuated chaotically around the ca-
pacity, resulting in low personal and social utility. High variation in the system was one
reason for suboptimality. The second was that at many times the bar was overcrowded
(above capacity), thus giving negative utility to attending agents.
Bell [2] tried to deal with the overcrowdedness problem by a simple adaptive strat-
egy used by all agents, which led to an outcome close to the socially optimal attendance.
Bell’s solution holds two pitfalls. The ﬁrst is that the same strategy must be used by all
agents, perhaps too strong a requirement in a distributed system with different design-
ers. The second is that in his simulations most of the attendees were “regulars” who
came all of the rounds, thus making for social injustice with the “casuals”.
Greenwald[8]alsotackledthissuboptimalityproblem,butusingadifferentmethod.
Agents that attended El Farol were required to “pay” some of their utility, and this
payoffwasdistributedamongallagentsthatdidnotattend.Notsurprisingly,theoptimal
payoff for optimal social utility converged to a 40% attendance fee, for the scenario of
100 agents and bar capacity of 60. Again, this solution may also be problematic in
many distributed systems, since it requires a central “utility distributer” that can reach
all agents.
The learning algorithm used in the parasitized El Farol simulation was the addi-
tive updating learning algorithm, introduced in [9]. Basically, each agent has a pool of
simple, personal deterministic strategies. Each such behavior has a weight, initially dis-
3 For a review of the minority problem, see [13].